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ABSTRACT
In this article, we propose an original analysis of advice given by financial 
analysts prior to WW1. Our article focuses on the writings of A. Neymarck, 
one of the most popular French analysts in the early 20th Century. The 
creation of portfolios from a new database composed of the monthly 
returns of all the security types listed on the official Paris Stock Exchange 
from 1903 to 1912 has provided results demonstrating that Neymarck 
correctly identified the risk in a number of sectors. The performances 
of these portfolios, which were built according to Neymarck’s guide-
lines, confirm Neymarck’s ranking in terms of both risk and return: the 
richer the investor, the riskier and the more profitable his portfolio was 
seen to be. Finally, the Modern Portfolio Theory enables us to pinpoint 
the few imperfections in Neymarck’s advice, which globally appears to 
be driven by reliable financial analysis.
1. Introduction
During the decades preceding the First World War, Great Britain and France were at the 
forefront of huge international capital flows (Woodruff, 1966; Fishlow, 1985; Goetzmann & 
Ukhov, 2006; Edlinger, Merli, & Parent, 2013). There were almost as many foreign issues as 
domestic issues on the Parisian market between 1900 and 1914 and on the eve of the First 
World War, the Paris Stock Exchange had fully developed, giving French investors wide access 
to many different securities issued by public or private issuers from not only European 
 countries but also more distant nations.
The French financial press also grew strongly from the beginning of the 19th century 
to 1914, with a rapidly increasing number of financial journals following the growth of the 
Paris Stock Exchange. In 1908, there were approximately 331 newspapers and journals 
dealing with economics and/or finance (L’Annuaire de la Presse Française et Étrangère, Paul 
Bluysen, 1908). The majority of these publications published information about security 
prices and revenues, and advised their investors about which securities they should sell 
or buy at any given time. In this context, the Annuaire de la Presse Française et Étrangère 
(1908 and former editions) provides information about the quality of the publications and 
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their ownership. Among the financial journals whose quality was not questioned were 
L’Economiste Français and Le Rentier. The latter was directed by Alfred Neymarck, one of 
the leading French financial analysts before WW1.1 Alfred Neymarck (1848-1924) was a 
member of several scientific societies and committees, including the Société Statistique 
de Paris, the Société d’Économie Politique, the Comité des Travaux Historiques et Scientifiques 
and the Conseil Supérieur de Statistique. He launched a journal in 1869 that focused on 
finance and business reports, but also reported the discussions of various scientific soci-
eties. In addition to his books and reports discussing economics, public finances and 
securities, Neymarck’s journal led to the publishing of his successful handbook Que doit-on 
faire de son argent? (1913), in which he ‘gathered in specific chapters several studies that 
have been regularly published in [his] journal Le Rentier under various headings for many 
years’ (Neymarck, 1913, p. 5).
In their analysis of a series of financial advice documents from the 1870 s to the begin-
ning of the twentieth century, Rutterford and Sotiropoulos (2016) documented that despite 
some differences between the UK and France, the main concepts of Modern Portfolio 
Theory (Markowitz, 1952, 1959) were discussed in both countries before WW1.2 ‘The core 
principles of Modern Portfolio Theory, namely, the risk-averse investor, the distinction 
between specific and systematic risk, the concept of correlation and the strategy of inter-
national diversification (on the basis that markets are segmented), appeared and were 
discussed both among UK and French financial experts, reviews, newspapers, books and 
pamphlets’ (Rutterford & Sotiropoulos, 2016, p. 940). Sotiropoulos and Rutterford (2018) 
used naïve diversification as a benchmark to show that before WW1, global naïve diversi-
fication, then called geographical distribution of risk and recommended by analysts in UK 
before WW1, was in fact a sophisticated strategy and was not sub-optimal compared to 
Markowitz optimization.
Our article goes beyond Rutterford and Sotiropoulos’ findings and uses Modern Portfolio 
Theory (hereafter referred to as MPT) to test the accuracy of financial advice in France during 
the pre-WW1 period, and specifically to assess the relevance of Neymarck’s financial advice 
at this time. This is achieved by the creation of a new database composed of the monthly 
returns of all regularly quoted securities on the Paris Stock Exchange from 1903 to 1912 and 
published in L’Économiste Français. We provide evidence that Neymarck correctly identified 
risk in a number of sectors. Our findings also confirm that his advice regarding investors’ 
wealth categories results in a clear hierarchy of risk-return trade-off. The construction of 
optimal portfolios according to Modern Portfolio Theory revealed few imperfections in 
Neymarck’s advice, which appears to be driven by the economic rationality and financial 
background of his time. The results highlight Neymarck’s ability to implement portfolio 
selection methodology 40 years before Markowitz’s famous works on diversification and 
portfolio selection.
Edlinger and Parent (2014) showed that Neymarck’s writings were more than mere guide-
lines for security investments. They are part of what Preda (2006, p. 150) defines as a pro-
to-science: a ‘heterogeneous set of practices, know-how techniques and rationalization 
procedures with the help of which social actors make sense of their economic environment 
and the economic consequences of their own actions…’. Edlinger and Parent (2014) provide 
evidence that Neymarck, and consequently the French investors who followed his advice, 
recognized the benefits of diversification before the First World War. Neymarck even cam-
paigned for an international portfolio diversification, referred to as the ‘division of capital 
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and risk’,3 which was designed to minimize the dispersion of returns. Neymarck (1913) dis-
tinguishes four categories of investors according to their wealth, and consequently according 
to the risk they can bear. These categories are ‘small rentiers, small capitalists’, ‘middle-class 
investors’, ‘well-off investors’; and ‘investors with large fortunes’. Neymarck classifies securities 
within three categories according to their risk level: sound investments, stock providing 
additional income, and speculative stock.4 He also suggests a very detailed portfolio com-
position for each type of investor. Whilst the portfolios of small investors should only be 
composed of the safest securities, richer investors are encouraged to invest a higher pro-
portion of their wealth in securities ‘for additional income’ and even in ‘speculative’ stocks 
for the richest of them. Neymarck suggests four portfolios, selecting up to 25 categories of 
securities for each category of investors, and specifies the weight that should be devoted 
to each category of assets.5
The portfolios suggested by Neymarck cover all the types of securities listed on the Paris 
Stock Exchange (PSE). Our analysis is based on the 10 years preceding the publication of 
Neymarck’s handbook in 1913, Que doit-on faire de son argent? A successful evaluation of 
Neymarck’s advice required a database that covered all the types of securities listed on the 
PSE during this period, but existing databases were not suitable for this purpose since they 
focus solely on specific types of securities at different frequencies and periods, and were 
built using different methodologies.6 Even if we had combined these databases, data for 
some types of securities (such as foreign and colonial shares and bonds) would still be 
missing. We therefore built an exhaustive database covering the range of securities recom-
mended by Neymarck from January 1903 to December 1912. This new database contains 
the monthly quotations for all the types of securities listed on the Paris Stock Exchange 
that were regularly quoted in the leading financial journal L’Économiste Français. This is one 
of the major contributions of this study.
Our methodology consists of stepping into the shoes of a typical French investor oper-
ating on the Parisian market from 1903 to 1914. We assume that investors select one source 
of information for prices and revenues. L’Economiste Français is an obvious choice, both 
for the excellent reputation of the journal and the recognized expertise of its director Paul 
Leroy-Beaulieu.7 Mermet (1882, p. 105) highlights how serious and popular the journal is: 
‘L’Économiste Français is amongst the most appreciated and respected journals. It is divided 
into three parts dedicated to political economy, business and finance, respectively. Every 
week, it features outstanding articles by Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, A. de Foville, A. de Feretperduis, 
Arthur Mangin, etc’. This journal has the additional interest of having been published every 
Saturday from 1873 to 1936, and reporting the last share price of the week, as quoted by 
the Cours Authentique.8 L’Economiste Français sorts securities according to their type (bonds, 
shares, government loans) and the industrial sectors to which they belong. Accordingly, 
our database includes all available security categories: French rentes, foreign government 
loans, public or local bonds, and private shares and bonds. It also takes into consideration 
the range of French industrial sectors, including the ever-present railway sector, mines, 
banks, metallurgy companies, maritime and land transport companies, gas, electricity 
and water.
The main body of our article is structured as follows: Sections 2 and 3 provide the detailed 
structure of the portfolios suggested by Alfred Neymarck (1913) and set out the different 
steps of the database construction, and Part 4 presents the methodology and results. We 
conclude our findings in the final section.
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2. L’Economiste Français and the writings of the French financial analyst 
Alfred Neymarck
2.1. L’Economiste Français: a reliable source of information
The literature pinpoints two main features when considering the development of the French 
financial press over the 19th century until WW1. First, there is a dramatic increase in the 
number of financial publications following the development of the Paris Stock Exchange. 
Second, an increasingly negative view develops of the relationships between these publi-
cations and the business and financial world. The commonly accepted opinion qualifies 
these relationships as ‘dangerous and scandalous collaborations’ over the 19th century 
(Beltran & Griset, 1994), suggesting an underlying and systematic suspicion of corruption.
With the rise of capitalism in France in the middle of the 19th century, a profusion of 
financial newspapers sought to follow and encourage investments. These included the 
Bulletin Financier, Le Capitaliste, Le Journal des Rentiers, Le Conseiller – Gazette des Chemins de 
Fer, Le Conseiller de l’Epargne, Cote de la Bourse et de la Banque, Le Crédit, Le Crédit national, Le 
Crédit Public, L’Echo Agricole, L’Echo du Commerce, L’Économiste Français, L’Epargne Française, 
Le Fermier, La Finance Nouvelle, Les Fonds Publics, L’Impartial Financier, L’Industrie, Le Journal 
des Actionnaires, Le Journal d’Agriculture et de Commerce, Le Journal d’Agriculture Pratique, le 
Journal des Chemins de Fer, Le Journal des Économistes, Le Journal de la Bourse, Le Messager de 
Paris, le Moniteur de la Bourse et de la Banque, Le Moniteur Financier, Le Moniteur des Tirages 
Financiers, Le Moniteur des Valeurs à Lot, Le Mouvement Financier, Le Portefeuille, Paris-Bourse, 
La Réforme Économique, La Semaine Financière and Le Tirage Financier.
The general suspicion around the French press was due to a specific process called ‘affer-
mage’. This involved newspapers leasing out their financial columns to financial institutions 
or banks, thus losing their journalistic independence in the eyes of the public. Beltran and 
Griset (1994) paraphrased Choderlos de Laclos to qualify the relationships between the 
French press and Paris Stock Exchange as ‘liaisons dangereuses’. Indeed, this view was dom-
inant among historians, writers such as Zola, and left-wing contemporary politicians. Jean 
Jaurès blamed the ‘trust’ of financial newspapers: ‘There is a trust of financial journals: it is a 
unique and centralized organization that delivers exactly the same report at the same time 
for any event; you can imagine the formidable influence that such a press necessarily exerts 
on public opinion by discrediting or firing at the same firms at the same time. This pushes 
opinion like a herd along the same path’ (Jean Jaurès, discours à la chambre, 6th April 1911).
This globally delivers a gloomy picture of the French press and explains the suspicion 
that economists showed towards it. Kindleberger (1989) described it as ‘venal journalism’ 
(p. 119) and ‘financial perfidy’ (p. 121). Lévy-Leboyer (1977) adopted a similarly extreme 
point of view regarding the reliability of French financial data: he systematically criticized 
the data provided by financial analysts and newspapers, all described as not only biased 
but also guilty of artificially boosting figures in order to retain the confidence of 
subscribers.
The Annuaire de la Presse Française et Étrangère (1908 and former editions) provides some 
details about the quality of the publications and their ownership: For instance, investors 
were aware that the Journal des Intérêts Financiers was owned by the Crédit Mobilier Français 
bank, and that it was likely to promote the financial products sold by this financial institution. 
Although this kind of information might not be available for every journal, there is no doubt 
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that it could be found in former editions of the Annuaire de la Presse Française et Étrangère 
or was frequently discussed in Parisian social circles.
It has to be noted that L’Économiste Français is never mentioned in cases about the venality 
of the press. On the contrary, it appears to be the most serious of the financial newspapers. 
We selected this journal for its regular quotations and reliable information. By selecting 
assets that were continuously quoted over a long period of time, we were a priori certain to 
have assets for which regular information was available to the public. Our working hypothesis 
(is that L’Économiste Français was probably the best financial journal in terms of public infor-
mation. As recalled by Parent and Rault (2004, p. 328–329): ‘Maurice Levy-Leboyer asserted 
that the financial information available to investors regarding foreign assets was routinely 
compromised by the informal and ongoing contact between the financial community in 
Paris and the French Foreign Office or the French government. It is difficult to ascertain, 
however, whether these contacts led to a systematic bias in the dissemination of inaccurate 
information because part of the risk and uncertainty associated with some foreign invest-
ments would have been deliberately hidden. However, one could also consider these papers 
as one of the rare sources of information that attempted to rationalize the decision making 
of investors by taking into account all the available information concerning a particular 
foreign investment’.
2.2. The writings of Alfred Neymarck
In the introduction, we reiterate that Neymarck’s activity in Le Rentier led him to publish his 
successful handbook Que doit-on faire de son argent? in 1913. In this publication, he strongly 
advocates the geographical distribution of capital. Indeed, Neymarck (1913, p. 348) states 
that ‘for risk division to be effective, there must be several placements of different types: 
national or local government loans, railway stock, various industrial companies and so on… 
But this is not enough… the diversification and decrease of risk should be carried out by 
distributing investments across stock from various countries’. Edlinger and Parent (2014) 
show that Neymarck (1913) recognizes risk-averse investors and advised them on the best 
composition of their portfolio. In particular, he distinguishes four categories of investors 
according to their wealth, and assumes that small investors cannot bear as much risk as 
richer investors. Neymarck (1913) follows the DARA principle, which states that risk aversion 
decreases as investor wealth increases. Consequently, the portfolio suggested to small inves-
tors is limited to the safest securities listed on the Paris Stock Exchange:
Small investors and small capitalists should only put their money into investments that may be 
called totally secure; we mean the government bonds, local or French colony loans, the Crédit 
Foncier or French railway bonds (Neymarck, 1913, pp. 365–366). This ‘safe’ base makes up the 
entire portfolio that is suggested to small investors (Table 1).
Neymarck (1913, pp. 365–366) does however specify that ‘This scale is only information, 
considering that this investor may change the suggested distribution according to their 
family circumstances, age, etc’. The ‘middle-class’ investor category is advised to diversify 
their portfolio with a wider range of securities that Neymarck considers to be riskier. He 
suggests that these investors should restrict the ‘safe’ base to 70% of their holdings and add 
some French corporate bonds, some shares in the main French railway companies (whose 
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Table 3. Portfolio suggested for ‘well-off investors’.
20% French rentes, colonial debts guaranteed by the French 
government
10% Bonds in the main French railway companies
5% unguaranteed colonial debts
10% Paris City bonds
10% Bonds issued by the Crédit Foncier
10% industrial and miscellaneous French bonds
15% shares in the main French railway companies
5% shares in credit and insurance companies
10% Debts of foreign countries
5% shares in French and foreign industrial companies
100%
source: neymarck, 1913, p. 377, reproduced by edlinger & Parent, 
2014, p. 399.
dividends are guaranteed by the French government) and some securities in the most reliable 
foreign governments (Table 2).
The portfolio share devoted to the ‘safe base’ is then reduced to 55% for the ‘well-off 
investors’. In addition to the investment categories advised for ‘middle-class investors’, these 
investors are also encouraged to complete their portfolio with more than 10% of shares in 
French industrial companies, credit and insurance companies, and French or foreign corpo-
rate bonds and shares (Table 3).
Neymarck considers that the wealthier investors can better accept potential capital losses. 
They can therefore include a greater proportion of riskier and potentially more profitable 
securities. As a result, the ‘safe’ base proportion is reduced to 35% in the portfolio suggestions 
for the richest investors. The range of investments advised for these ‘investors with large 
fortunes’ covers almost all the securities listed on the Paris Stock Exchange prior to the First 
World War (Table 4).
Table 1. Portfolio suggested for ‘small investors’.
30% French rentes, colonial debts guaranteed by the French 
government
20% railway bonds guaranteed by the French government
10% unguaranteed colonial debts
20% Paris City bonds
20% Bonds issued by the Crédit Foncier
100%
source: neymarck, 1913, p. 365, reproduced by edlinger & Parent, 
2014, p. 38.
Table 2. Portfolio suggested for ‘middle-class investors’.
25% French rentes, colonial debts guaranteed by the French 
government
15% Bonds in the main French railway companies
10% unguaranteed colonial debts
10% Paris City bonds
10% Bonds issued by the Crédit Foncier
10% industrial and miscellaneous French bonds
10% shares in the main French railway companies
10% Debts of foreign countries
100%
source: neymarck, 1913, p .372, reproduced by edlinger & Parent, 
2014, p. 38.
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Neymarck admitted that the restricted portfolio and limited financial means of ‘small 
investors’ meant that they could not obtain the same returns as the richest investors:
The small rentiers, whose means are weak, who often just have what is required to survive, are 
the ones who have to be content with tiny incomes, investments under 3%, investments at 
2.5% or 2%, or at ‘almost nothing percent’, as the scoffers would say; whilst the big stock holders 
can afford investments yielding 4.5% or 6%! (Neymarck, 1913, pp. 284–285; Edlinger & Parent, 
2014, p. 37, footnote 34.)
At a general point of view, Neymarck (1913) invites the reader to a form of ‘Discourse of 
the method’. This method consists of a classification method that is initially based on the 
type of investor, then on a proportion of types of assets to be respected within the portfolio 
of each category of investor. Neymarck’s classification method is therefore to favor asset 
classes (by identifying types of investors) rather than promoting particular assets rather than 
others.10
Neymarck (1913) only clearly names three assets, which are all included in the portfolio 
of ‘small investors’. Two of them correspond to an investment category. These three assets are:
Table 4. Portfolio suggested for ‘rich investors’.
French rentes
3% perpetual French rentes 5%
3% redeemable French rentes 10%
Colonial Debts 5%
Bonds in main railways  
companies
2,5% Bonds 5%
3% Bonds 5%
Paris City and Credit Foncier  
Bonds
Paris City bonds 2.50%
Bonds issued by the Crédit Foncier 2.50%
3% and 4% industrial Bonds 10%
shares
shares in a 6 main railways companies 6%
shares in Algerian railways companies 3%
shares in secondary railway network 
companies
2%
shares in French banks 5%
share in life insurance companies 3%
share in fire insurance companies 2%
shares in colliery companies 3%
shares in metalworking, steelworks and 
building companies
3%
shares in transportations, tramways and 
electricity companies
3%
total domestic securities 75%
Governement loans and foreign 
securities
Debts of low-risk countries 5%
Debts of moderate-risk countries 3%
Debts of high-risk countries 2%
3% and 4% industrial Bonds 5%
shares in foreign railways companies 3%
shares in foreign banks 5%
shares in various foreign industrial 
companies
2%
total 100%
source: neymarck, 1913, p. 377, reproduced by edlinger & Parent, 2014, p. 40.
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• The 3% French rente: this makes up part of the 30% of the portfolio dedicated to ‘French 
rentes and other colonial loans guaranteed by the State’. Neymarck considers this 3% 
French rente to be one of a number of perpetual funds that are ‘an absolute security’ 
(page 366).
• City of Paris Bonds and Crédit Foncier Bonds, each accounting for 20% of the total portfolio 
of ‘small capitalists and rentiers’.
On p. 372, Neymarck’s (1913) recommendations to the ‘middle class’ highlight new cate-
gories of securities: French industrial bonds, shares in the French railways and foreign 
Government funds. Neymarck justifies this selection by the economic argument of the liquid-
ity of the market to which they are backed. Shares in French railways (the only variable- 
income assets included in this asset class) are described as follows by the author: ‘These are 
the only variable-income securities that we have indicated to middle-class security-holders; 
they are, moreover, variable-income securities of a very special nature, given that the State, 
under the terms of the 1883 agreement, guarantees them a minimum dividend. This mini-
mum income is 38 francs for the East, 88 francs for Lyon, 80 francs for the South, 56 francs 
for Orleans, 84 francs for the North’ (p. 374). The investor is therefore free to select these 
securities as he wishes. Finally, for the category of ‘capitalists and rentiers’, no advice is given 
for the choice of securities to be included in the portfolio:
It is, of course, impossible to highlight categories among all these assets of such diverse origins 
and importance, it is a priori appropriate to put this one in the portfolio or to discard that one; 
we must limit ourselves to general observations on this point (p. 380).
This study seeks to reconstruct the portfolio advice provided by Neymarck and measure 
its efficiency (in line with the Modern Portfolio Theory) under several assumptions based on 
the actual returns of the securities listed on L’Economiste Francais from 1903 to 1912.
3. Creation of a new database using the financial information published 
in L’Économiste Français
As explained in the introduction, no existing database was adequate for the reconstruction 
of these portfolios; even if we had combined them all, some types of securities would still 
have been missing. Our new database is entirely composed of the information provided by 
L’Economiste Français, the most popular journal at that time, known for its reliability. For this 
reason, this database can be considered as an indicator of available public information. We 
first photographed the financial part of the 520 editions published between December 1902 
and December 1912. The documents were provided by the library of the Faculty of Law, 
Economics and Management in Nancy. Eight well-differentiated categories of securities were 
identified, namely French and Colonial Debts, Other French Public and Municipal Debts, 
Corporate Bonds, Main Foreign Government Debts, Shares in Railways in France and Abroad, 
Bank Shares, Insurance Shares and Shares issued by ‘Various Companies’.
We collected the most recently published price at the end of the current month. When 
the security considered had not been quoted during the last week of the month, we took 
the price of the previous week into consideration (this concerns less than 0.1% of the prices 
of the final database). We then calculated the monthly returns for every security according 
to the following formula:
R
P D P
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Where
Ri,t refers to the return of security i for the month t;
Pi,t refers to the price of security i for the month t;
Di,t refers to the dividend or coupon of security i received during the month t;
These are nominal returns. As our aim is to replicate available information, we do not 
correct the returns with a price index, built post-date. Moreover, Bouvier (1979, p. 42) notes 
that prior to 1914 ‘the word “inflation” is only defined in dictionaries as “pathological swelling”, 
because it does not exist in economics. Prices are directed by gold standard constraints, the 
slow growth of consumption, the compression of domestic demand, and the success of 
production and productivity. The inflationist era begins beyond this point’. Asselain (1984) 
has a similar opinion, claiming that the rise in prices is not anticipated because it isn’t a 
‘perennial reality’.
We excluded 23 securities because of their specificities: premium bonds, ‘jouissance’ 
shares and founders’ shares. Leroy-Beaulieu (1906) and Neymarck (1913) give precise defi-
nitions of the various type of categories listed on the Paris Stock Exchange. Premium bonds 
are debt securities which offer an additional income when reimbursed as a result of a lottery, 
in addition to the coupons. ‘Bons’ are equivalent to zero-coupon bonds, since there is no 
coupon during their lifetime. As we do not have any precise information regarding these 
additional incomes (amount, quantity, due date), they have been removed from our data-
base. ‘Jouissance’ shares are usually issued by companies with public concessions when the 
ordinary shares are reimbursed during the company’s lifetime. They give neither voting rights 
nor dividends, but their owners can obtain a share of any additional profit or remaining asset 
on the dissolution of the company. Founders’ shares are very similar except that they are 
granted to company’s founders without any financial counterpart. Due to their particular 
and marginal status in comparison with other types of security, we have decided to exclude 
them from this study.
As a result, our database is exclusively composed of rentes, ordinary shares and bonds. 
We therefore only retain the securities traded every month. Between January 1903 and 
December 1912, 139 securities matched this constraint. Unfortunately, no single share in 
insurance was traded without interruption throughout the period in question. In order to 
continue using these two sectors (share of life insurance companies, share of fire insurance 
companies) quoted by Neymarck, we built two indices by calculating their monthly returns 
as the average of the monthly returns of the securities composing them (15 stocks for the 
share of life companies and 17 stocks for share of fire insurance companies, see Table 5). The 
resulting database consists of 139 individual securities (from 23 different sectors) and 2 
insurance indices (for life insurance and fire insurance).11
We corrected the prices and the corresponding returns according to the various events 
that could affect the prices of securities, such as the assimilation of securities, mergers or 
nominal value division. These are detected by observing the average returns and the max-
imum and minimum returns of each security: extreme values are often an indicator of this 
type of event. Substantial research is needed to identify the reasons behind these extreme 
price variations; although most of the information is available in the journal, it does not 
necessarily accompany the price movements. Sometimes these anomalous values simply 
• The 3% French rente: this makes up part of the 30% of the portfolio dedicated to ‘French 
rentes and other colonial loans guaranteed by the State’. Neymarck considers this 3% 
French rente to be one of a number of perpetual funds that are ‘an absolute security’ 
(page 366).
• City of Paris Bonds and Crédit Foncier Bonds, each accounting for 20% of the total portfolio 
of ‘small capitalists and rentiers’.
On p. 372, Neymarck’s (1913) recommendations to the ‘middle class’ highlight new cate-
gories of securities: French industrial bonds, shares in the French railways and foreign 
Government funds. Neymarck justifies this selection by the economic argument of the liquid-
ity of the market to which they are backed. Shares in French railways (the only variable- 
income assets included in this asset class) are described as follows by the author: ‘These are 
the only variable-income securities that we have indicated to middle-class security-holders; 
they are, moreover, variable-income securities of a very special nature, given that the State, 
under the terms of the 1883 agreement, guarantees them a minimum dividend. This mini-
mum income is 38 francs for the East, 88 francs for Lyon, 80 francs for the South, 56 francs 
for Orleans, 84 francs for the North’ (p. 374). The investor is therefore free to select these 
securities as he wishes. Finally, for the category of ‘capitalists and rentiers’, no advice is given 
for the choice of securities to be included in the portfolio:
It is, of course, impossible to highlight categories among all these assets of such diverse origins 
and importance, it is a priori appropriate to put this one in the portfolio or to discard that one; 
we must limit ourselves to general observations on this point (p. 380).
This study seeks to reconstruct the portfolio advice provided by Neymarck and measure 
its efficiency (in line with the Modern Portfolio Theory) under several assumptions based on 
the actual returns of the securities listed on L’Economiste Francais from 1903 to 1912.
3. Creation of a new database using the financial information published 
in L’Économiste Français
As explained in the introduction, no existing database was adequate for the reconstruction 
of these portfolios; even if we had combined them all, some types of securities would still 
have been missing. Our new database is entirely composed of the information provided by 
L’Economiste Français, the most popular journal at that time, known for its reliability. For this 
reason, this database can be considered as an indicator of available public information. We 
first photographed the financial part of the 520 editions published between December 1902 
and December 1912. The documents were provided by the library of the Faculty of Law, 
Economics and Management in Nancy. Eight well-differentiated categories of securities were 
identified, namely French and Colonial Debts, Other French Public and Municipal Debts, 
Corporate Bonds, Main Foreign Government Debts, Shares in Railways in France and Abroad, 
Bank Shares, Insurance Shares and Shares issued by ‘Various Companies’.
We collected the most recently published price at the end of the current month. When 
the security considered had not been quoted during the last week of the month, we took 
the price of the previous week into consideration (this concerns less than 0.1% of the prices 
of the final database). We then calculated the monthly returns for every security according 
to the following formula:
R
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reflect the bankruptcy of some companies. These extreme values can also be the signal of 
a nominal division of a security or a signal of a merger. For instance, this is the case of the 
share prices of the life insurance Companies Générale, Nationale and Phénix which were 
divided by five in May 1908 after a nominal division.
The monthly return of each index is calculated as the arithmetic average of the monthly 
returns of the securities making up this index. To avoid anachronism, we do not use security 
capitalization or outstanding debt value. Indeed, the complex calculations and data collec-
tion required by this process make this an unlikely preoccupation for a French investor prior 
to 1914, and Neymarck never mentions these criteria. In addition, neither L’Economiste 
Français nor the Cours Authentique report capitalizations or outstanding bond loan amounts. 
We can therefore presume that this information was not included in the portfolio decision 
process of French investors prior to 1914.
Ultimately, our database includes all available assets’ categories: French rentes, French 
public or local bonds, foreign government debts, French and foreign private shares and 
bonds. It is initially organized in eight main categories, similar to those of L’Economiste 
Français. We reorganized them into 25 categories corresponding to the most detailed cate-
gories described by Neymarck (1913).12 Table 5 describes these indices (wording and number) 
and gives the number of securities within each of them (first and second column). The third 
column gives the value of the monthly arithmetic average return, and the last column gives 
the monthly standard deviation.13
Over the period from 1903 to 1912, shares represent a higher overall risk than bonds. 
Only foreign railway bonds and French industrial bonds are as risky as some share indices. 
Table 5. Description of the 25 indices.
number index name
number of 
securities
Monthly average 
returns
standad 
deviation
1 3% perpetual French rentes 1 0.1708 0.7128
2 3% redeemable French rentes 1 0.2065 0.7235
3 Colonial loans guaranted by French government 3 0.1683 0.9370
4 unguaranted Colonial debts 3 0.2024 0.8870
5 Paris City bonds 8 0.1551 0.6618
6 Bonds issued by the Crédit Foncier 8 0.1649 0.6417
7 2,5% Bonds in main railways companies 2 0.1451 0.7777
8 3% Bonds in main railways companies 10 0.1859 0.7473
9 Bonds issued by foreign railways companies 16 0.3030 1.3030
10 Bonds in industrial and miscellaneaous French 
companies
3 0.4117 1.2252
11 shares in a 6 main railways companies 6 0.2800 1.3720
12 shares in Algerian railways companies 3 0.2994 1.1558
13 shares in secondary railway network companies 1 −0.0194 5.7552
14 shares in foreign railways companies 7 0.6160 2.9937
15 shares in French banks 11 0.6651 1.3793
16 shares in life insurance companies 1(15) 1.0724 2.3507
17 shares in fire insurance companies 1(17) 0.4972 1.8229
18 shares in foreign banks 3 0.4482 1.5791
19 shares in collery companies 12 0.9005 2.1234
20 shares in metalworking, steelworks and building 
companies
7 0.8494 2.4054
21 shares in transportations, tramways and 
electricity companies
5 0.4597 3.5470
22 shares in various indutrial companies 8 0.7341 2.7383
23 Debts of low-risk countries 8 0.2256 0.7823
24 Debts of moderate-risk countries 12 0.4261 1.3126
25 Debts of high-risk countries 3 0.5119 2.1621
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The same applies for returns: with the exception of foreign railway and French industrial 
bonds, all the other fixed income indices are less profitable than share indices.
Share indices are the best performing indices in terms of average monthly returns, and 
this is particularly true of shares in French life insurance companies (index 16) and French 
and foreign industrial companies (indices 19, 20), followed by shares in French banks (index 
15), which have the additional advantage of being less risky than the preceding categories, 
and foreign railway companies (index 14). Share indices are also the most volatile indices. 
The worst performing index – in terms of return and volatility – is also a share index, namely 
shares in secondary French railway companies (index 13).
The ‘main French railway companies’ (indices 7, 8 and 11) are the six companies for which 
the French State guarantees a minimum dividend: these are the Compagnie du Nord, de l’Est, 
du Midi, de l’Ouest, de Lyon and d’Orléans. The Algerian railway companies whose shares make 
up index 15 are the companies of Bône-Guelma, Est-Algérien and Ouest-Algérien. They also 
benefit from a guarantee from the French government. Foreign railway bonds and shares come 
solely from southern Europe and Austria. There are three securities in the industrial bond index, 
issued by the Compagnie Transatlantique (Maritime transportation), Fives-Lille (Metalworking) 
and the Compagnie Générale des Eaux (Water). The industrial shares indices (19, 20, 21 and 
22) are composed of 32 securities: the colliery shares index (index 19) contains 12 stocks of 
French colliery companies, and the metalworking, steelworks and building shares index (index 
20) is composed of 7 stocks. Index 24 is mainly composed of shares in transportation compa-
nies. Both maritime and land transportation encountered great difficulties prior to the First 
World War, which explains why this index performs weakly in comparison to the other French 
industry indices. From the end of the nineteenth century onwards, many attempts were made 
to modernize land transportation and to move from horse-drawn transport to steam machines 
then to electricity. This rendered omnibus and some tramway lines obsolete, requiring huge 
investments. René Girault (1979, pp. 203–206) explains the difficulties of French maritime trans-
portation over the same period: between 1897 and 1913, the French navy slipped from the 
second to the sixth world place in terms of shipped volume, far behind Great Britain and 
Germany.
The share index in various foreign industrial companies (index 22) is composed of 8 stocks 
from various industrial sectors: two are issued by the Suez company, three by mining com-
panies whose exploitation sites are located in the South of Europe and one, for an oil rig in 
Russia, issued by the company Naphte de Bakou. There is also one water company and one 
Spanish gas company.
The French banks index (index 15) is made up of shares in major banks, many of which 
still exist today: the Banque de France, the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, the Comptoir 
National d’Escompte de Paris, the Crédit Industriel et Commercial, the Société Générale pour 
le développement du commerce et de l’industrie, the Crédit Lyonnais, etc. There are three 
foreign bank shares (index 18) issued by Austria, Egypt and the Ottoman Empire.
The debts of low-risk countries are composed of British consols and bonds issued by 
Scandinavian countries (Finland, Norway and Sweden), Switzerland, and the Netherlands. 
The debts of moderate-risk countries are composed of bonds issued by European countries, 
namely Austria, Hungary, Greece, Spain and Italy. This category also includes securities issued 
by the governments of Argentina, Brazil and Russia. Finally, there are three bonds issued by 
less secure countries, i.e. Bulgaria, Serbia and the Ottoman Empire.
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4. Methodology and empirical results
4.1. Risk perception of each category of assets by Neymarck
Before carrying out a detailed analysis of the portfolios proposed by Neymarck, we compared 
the investment universes he suggests for each type of investor. He builds them by progres-
sively adding riskier types of securities to the ‘safe’ base. This analysis is based on Table 5 
(Section 3).
The first eight indices are the indices composing the ‘safe’ base: the two French rentes (indi-
ces 1 and 2), colonial debts (guaranteed or not; indices 3 and 4), Paris city bonds (index 5), the 
bonds issued by the Crédit Foncier (index 6) and the bonds in the main railway companies 
(indices 7 and 8). Neymarck considers these to be the safest categories for investment (1913, 
page 373). Table 5 shows that they are, indeed, the least volatile indices. The debts of low-risk 
countries (index 23) also show similar properties. Figure 1 shows the indices according to their 
average return and their risk measured by the standard deviation: These eight first indices are 
remarkably close to each other. Additionally, with the exception of the 3% redeemable French 
rente and the 2.5% railway bonds, these indices are highly correlated, with correlation coeffi-
cients ranging from 0.45 to 0.85 (see Supplementary material, Appendix 1). This outcome 
suggests that Neymarck has correctly identified the safe base, i.e. the most secured securities. 
It is worth noting that the debts of low-risk countries could have been added to this group of 
indices. Neymarck added this category as early as the second portfolio (Table 2). This could 
indicate that he was aware of its low volatility. He writes (page 375) that these indices offer ‘a 
slightly higher income than the French rentes with excellent safety guarantees’.
For middle-class investors, Neymarck suggests building a portfolio that is mainly concen-
trated on the safe base (representing 70% of the portfolio). He adds three of the least volatile 
categories: the debts of low-risk countries (index 23, included in the first group highlighted 
in Figure 1), shares in the main French railway companies (index 11, included in the second 
group in Figure 1) and bonds in industrial companies (index 10, included in the second group 
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in Figure 1). These indices actually add slightly more return and volatility to the portfolio. 
The safe base only represents 55% of the advised portfolio for well-off investors, and the 
three additional categories mentioned for the middle-class investors now make up 35% of 
the portfolio (i.e. 5% more than for the middle-class investors). In addition, Neymarck sug-
gests adding much riskier indices with average returns that are between 3 and 6 times higher 
than those of the safe base indices. These indices are the bank and insurance share indices14 
(indices 15, 16, 17) and the industrial share indices (indices 19, 20, 21 and 22). Note that these 
very high returns are not observed for shares in transportation, tramways and electricity, 
which are very risky for an average return that is only twice as high as those of safe-base 
indices). The portfolio suggested to the richest investors (investors with large fortunes) 
includes all possible categories
Finally, Neymarck (1913) established the classification between the three categories of 
foreign government debts. It is interesting to note how this author identified foreign debts 
according to their risk and return levels (see Table 5 and Figure 1): the foreign government 
debts of low-risk countries are indeed the least risky but also the least profitable, whilst the 
debts of high-risk countries (third class foreign debts) are both the riskiest and the most 
profitable of all foreign government debt categories. This fits the link made by Neymarck 
(1913) between risk and return.
This first result demonstrates that Neymarck correctly identified the least risky categories 
of assets, namely the safe base, and successfully evaluates the overall risk of each sector.
4.2. Advised versus optimal portfolios
Taking our analysis one step further, we considered a risk-averse investor who follows the 
Modern Portfolio Theory principles, and specifically applies the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(Sharpe, 1963; Lintner, 1965; Mossin, 1966). A classical methodology is implemented to test 
the rationality of investments, as used by Goetzmann and Ukhov (2006) or Edlinger, Merli, 
and Parent (2013). The idea is that if investors used monthly returns from January 1903 to 
December 1912 to form their risk/return expectations for January 1913, the mean variance 
solution would maximize their utility and would be superior ex post to any other advised 
recommendation.15 By using Markowitz mean variance optimization as an efficiency bench-
mark, we can compare the portfolios that we expect rational investors to have held on the 
eve of the First World War with those suggested by Neymarck (1913).
The diversification principle postulates that when building a portfolio with imperfectly 
correlated stocks, an investor can reduce the overall variance of his portfolio, thereby reduc-
ing its risk. This investor should select an efficient portfolio, i.e. a portfolio providing minimum 
variance for a given expected return (or providing maximum expected return for a given 
variance). The set of efficient portfolios is called the efficient frontier of risky assets or the mean 
variance frontier. When a risk-free asset is available on the financial market, the efficient 
portfolio with the highest Sharpe ratio is the optimal one. The Sharpe ratio measures the 
excess of return compared to the risk-free rate by risk unit and is defined as:
where E[r˜x] is the expected return of the portfolio, σ[r˜x] is the volatility of the portfolio and 
rf is the risk-free rate.
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These investors allocate their wealth according to the previous monthly returns of assets 
As Neymarck had keenly observed economic life since the beginning of the century, we 
based our analysis on a long period from 1903 to 1912. The probability distribution of stock 
returns was used to construct the efficient frontier and find the optimal portfolio for each 
type of investor. For this study, the investment universes of each type of investor are con-
sidered to correspond to those suggested by Neymarck. For instance, the universe of small 
investors is composed of French rentes, colonial debts guaranteed by the French govern-
ment, railway bonds guaranteed by the French government, un-guaranteed colonial debts, 
Paris city bonds, and bonds issued by the Crédit Foncier (see Table 1). Similarly, the investment 
universe of investors with large fortunes covers all the stocks listed on our database (see 
Table 4). As a consequence, we constructed four mean variance frontiers and four optimal 
portfolios.
Statistical analysis revealed that no asset was risk-free: the standard deviation of every 
security of our database is above 0.5% and below 11.4% (or annual standard deviations of 
around 1.7% and 39.5%, respectively). Neymarck (1913, p. 364) expresses the view that no 
security, even the ‘safest’, is risk-free: ‘All the securities, without exception, have some risks; 
the expression tranquil security, safe security is only an expression; in fact, securities, like real 
estate investments, can be hazardous’.16 He nevertheless considers the 3% French rente to 
be the safest security17:
We consider the 3% French [perpetual] rente, our great national fund, to be absolutely safe 
because it has a signature that will never be refused: that of France. Nevertheless, like every 
security, it is subject to varying fluctuation: one must, indeed, bear in mind that in addition to 
the intrinsic value of this security and the soundness of its guarantees, there is another com-
ponent that influences the determination of its price: the cost of money, which is very variable 
and depends on the monetary, economic and financial situation of the country. (Neymarck, 
1913, p. 365–366)
According to Neymarck, any investment in the 3% French rente should be made on the 
long-term because the investor can be sure of the regular payment of coupons (Neymarck, 
1913, p. 367). In addition, like the other securities of the safe base, the French rente is accepted 
by the Banque de France as a guarantee for short-term loans. This means that investors who 
needed money could keep their securities and obtain a short-term loan from this financial 
institution. For Neymarck (1913, p. 373), this option was particularly interesting for the inves-
tor at times when selling securities would lead to capital losses: ‘It is interesting to hold in 
one’s portfolio a certain number of securities against which the Banque de France agrees to 
accord a loan, thus making it possible, at a given time and for a short period, to easily obtain 
funds without selling the securities at the wrong time and running the risk of having to buy 
them back at a higher price later, once the squall has passed’.
Finally, this study does not consider short sales – our intention is to scrupulously replicate 
Neymarck’s portfolios, and no such strategy is described in his portfolio advice. Similarly, 
Hayaux Du Tilly (1901) argues that short sales are practiced on a small scale and only by 
professionals. Neymarck’s advice is clearly not intended for professionals: ‘This book is not 
intended for the professionals of the Stock Exchange’ (Neymarck, 1913, p. V).18
Our optimal portfolios and the efficient frontiers of risky assets were built under two main 
assumptions, namely A1: There is no risk-free asset; A2: The 3% perpetual French rente is 
considered as the risk-free French asset. The risk-free rate is thus equal to the average monthly 
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return of this asset from 1903 to 1912, namely 0.171%, and the optimal portfolio is the 
portfolio which maximizes the Sharpe ratio. Under assumption A1, we compare the portfolio 
advised by Neymarck with the efficient portfolios that have the same risk. Under a third 
assumption (A3), the 3% perpetual French rente is considered as a benchmark for risk-free 
investment by French investors. We therefore consider it as the new numeraire. The prices 
of all assets are expressed in rente units, i.e. investors assess security performances through 
the prism of the performance of the 3% perpetual French rente.19
For each assumption described above (A1, A2 and A3), we constructed optimal portfolios 
for each type of investor according to their investment universe. For each type of investor, 
the investment universe is limited to the categories suggested by Neymarck (see Tables 1–4).
As a main test, we determined the optimal portfolios when the investment universe is 
composed of indices (called Optimal Portfolio Indices). This portfolio is then compared to 
Neymarck’s advised portfolio (called Advised Portfolio Indices).
We also carry out two robustness tests. First, we determined the optimal portfolios for 
each type of investor, presuming that the investment universe is composed of stocks. We 
built the advised portfolios based on the assumption that investors are free to select one 
security or more from the categories suggested by Neymarck. The proportions invested in 
this portfolio must respect the proportions advised by Neymarck (this portfolio is called 
Advised Portfolio Stocks). The Advised Portfolio Stocks could be viewed as the best combination 
of securities while respecting the proportions suggested by this analyst. This portfolio is 
then compared to the optimal portfolio obtained from the stock universe (called Optimal 
Portfolio Stocks). A second robustness test determined the optimal portfolios for each type 
of investor, based on the assumption that the investment universe is composed of the best 
stock of each category.
The small investor’s investment universe is limited to the eight first categories shown in 
Table 5, namely the two 3% French rentes, the two colonial debts indices, the Paris city bonds 
index, the bonds issued by the Crédit Foncier and the 2.5% and 3% bonds in main French railway 
companies. When the 3% perpetual French rente is considered as the risk-free French asset, 
the small investor’s Optimal Portfolio Indices is the combination of these eight indices, which 
maximizes the Sharpe ratio. The Advised Portfolio Indices for small investors is a portfolio in 
which 30% is attributed to French rentes and guaranteed colonial debt indices, 20% to the 
Paris city bonds index, 20% to the Crédit Foncier bonds index, 10% to the unguaranteed colonial 
debts and 20% to the index of shares in main French railway companies (see Tables 1–4 and 
Table 6 for each advised portfolio composition).
The Optimal Portfolio Stocks for small investors is the combination of stocks belonging to 
the eight above-mentioned categories, which maximizes the Sharpe ratio. In the Advised 
Portfolio Stocks portfolio, 30% is attributed to one security or more from the guaranteed 
French rentes and colonial debts categories, 20% to one security or more from the Paris city 
bonds category, 20% to one security or more from the Crédit Foncier bonds category and 
20% to one security or more from the main French railway company share category.
Table 6 details the composition of the advised portfolios: it cross-references Tables 1–4 
with the categories we built. When the existence of a risk-free asset is taken into account for 
the building of portfolios (Assumption A2), the weight of the 3% French perpetual rente is 
set to zero and the weights of other categories are recalculated so that the sum of the weights 
of all the categories is equal to one.
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When we work on indices, where Neymarck suggests that one proportion should be 
divided among several indices, we weight each of these indices equally20. For example, 
Neymarck advises small investors to invest 20% of their portfolio in bonds issued by the 
main French railway companies. We thus consider that these investors split this investment 
equally between the 2.5% bonds and 3.5% bonds issued by main French railway companies.
4.3. Portfolio risk and return analysis
Table 7 illustrates the clear hierarchy between the four investors, which is consistent with 
Neymarck’s hypothesis: investors with greater means and thus wider investment opportu-
nities obtain portfolios with higher return and higher risk. We note the same outcome in 
each case (indices or stocks) under our two assumptions A1 and A2 (see Table 7).
Table 7 shows the performances of optimal and advised portfolios for each type of 
investor under assumptions A1 and A2, when considering indices or securities. For each 
portfolio, it details the monthly average return (Return), the associated standard deviation 
(Risk) and the number of indices or securities involved. The Sharpe ratios are given under 
assumption A2.
Under assumption A1, when considering indices and following Neymarck’s advice, inves-
tors could obtain an annual return of about 2.1% for small investors, 2.6% for middle-class 
investors, 3.3% for well-off investors and 4.5% for investors with large fortunes. When working 
Table 6. Composition of the advised portfolios.
index name
small 
investors
Middle-class 
investors
Well-off 
investors
Large Fortunes 
investors
1 3% perpetual French rentes 5%
2 3% redeemable French rentes 30% 25% 20% 10%
3 Colonial loans guaranted by French government 5%
4 unguaranted Colonial debts 10% 10% 5%
5 Paris City bonds 20% 10% 10% 3%
6 Bonds issued by the Crédit Foncier 20% 10% 10% 3%
7 2,5% Bonds in main railways companies 20% 15% 10% 5%
8 3% Bonds in main railways companies 5%
9 Bonds issued by foreign railways companies 5%
10 Bonds in industrial and miscellaneaous French 
companies
10% 10% 10%
11 shares in a 6 main railways companies 10% 15% 6%
12 shares in Algerian railways companies 3%
13 shares in secondary railway network companies 2%
14 shares in foreign railways companies 3%
15 shares in French banks 5%
16 share in life insurance companies 5% 3%
17 share in fire insurance companies 2%
18 shares in foreign banks 5%
19 shares in collery companies 3%
20 shares in metalworking, steelworks and building 
companies
5% 3%
21 shares in transportations, tramways and electricity 
companies
3%
22 shares in various indutrial companies 2%
23 Debts of low-risk countries 10% 10% 5%
24 Debts of moderate-risk countries 3%
25 Debts of high-risk countries 2%
total 100% 100% 100% 100%
source: neymarck, 1913.
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on securities, the range of return is from 2.4% to 5%. Under assumption A2, the range of 
return is from 2.1% to 4.6% when working on indices and from 2.4% to 6.2% when stocks 
are considered. This hierarchy is consistent with Neymarck’s predictions. As we mentioned 
earlier, Neymarck reports that small investors should only seek returns of between 2% and 
3%, whilst bigger investors can seek for returns of up to 4.5% or 6%.
Similarly, our findings indicate that the Sharpe ratios of the advised portfolios increase 
with the wealth of investors. For instance, the value of the Sharpe ratio when considering 
indices under assumption A2 is about 0.0019 for small investors and reaches a value of 0.25 
for investors with large fortunes (0.08 for middle-class investors, 0.16 for well-off investors). 
The performances of the portfolios built according to Neymarck’s guidelines therefore con-
firm the ranking announced by the analyst, both in terms of risk and in terms of return: the 
richer the investor, the riskier and the more profitable his portfolio will be. This result sug-
gests that the benefit of diversification is therefore clearly exploited by the analyst.
4.4. Structure of the advised portfolios compared to efficiency
Figure 2 shows the efficient frontier built on all indexes and the advised portfolios obtained 
under assumption A1. It provides a general idea of the position of each advice portfolio regard-
ing the distance to the global efficient frontier and not surprisingly, shows that none of these 
portfolios are efficient. If we compare each portfolio with the optimal portfolio (on the efficient 
frontier) bearing the same risk, there is a very similar lack of return. The value is 0.163 for small 
investors, 0.191 for middle-class investors, 0.173 for well-off investors and 0.19 for rich 
investors.21
Table 7. Portfolios performances according to investor type.
A1: no risk free asset
 
optimal 
(risk) indices
optimal 
(risk) stocks
investors small Middle-Class Well-off Large 
Fortunes
investors small Middle-Class Well-off Large 
Fortunes
return 0.187% 0.235% 0.449% 0.564% return 0.223% 0.288% 0.534% 0.634%
risk 0.543% 0.615% 0.664% 0.825% risk 0.438% 0.538% 0.549% 0.627%
number 5 6 9 9 number 6 7 15 17
  Advised indices Advised stocks
return 0.172% 0.214% 0.274% 0.374% return 0.201% 0.264% 0.349% 0.414%
risk 0.543% 0.615% 0.664% 0.825% risk 0.438% 0.538% 0.549% 0.627%
number 8 11 18 25 number 12 16 23 37
   
A2 : the 3% French rente is the risk free asset
  optimal indices optimal stocks
investors small Middle-Class Well-off Large 
Fortunes
investors small Middle-Class Well-off Large 
Fortunes
return 0.206% 0.412% 0.838% 0.838% return 0.222% 0.510% 0.645% 0.716%
risk 0.681% 1.220% 1.281% 1.281% risk 0.422% 0.805% 0.689% 0.755%
sHArPe 0.051 0.197 0.521 0.521 sHArPe 0.120 0.422 0.689 0.723
number 2 2 5 5 number 6 2 15 26
  Advised indices Advised stocks
return 0.172% 0.218% 0.218% 0.385% return 0.199% 0.265% 0.393% 0.519%
risK 0.548% 0.625% 0.676% 0.845% risK 0.435% 0.539% 0.626% 0.829%
sHArPe 0.00 0.08 0.16 0.25 sHArPe 0.07 0.02 0.35 0.42
number 7 10 17 24 number 35 50 20 39
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To analyze the lack of efficiency of Neymarck’s suggested portfolios in greater detail, we 
compare the optimal portfolios to the portfolios advised by Neymarck (using indices or 
stocks) for each category of investors (with four different investment universes). Under 
assumption A2, loss of efficiency is measured by comparing the level of the Sharpe ratios. 
Under assumption A1, we compare the portfolio advised by Neymarck with efficient port-
folios that have the same risk.
There is a clear loss of efficiency for each category of investors in the advised portfolios 
compared to the same categories in the efficient portfolios (see Table 7). For instance, under 
assumption A2, Sharpe ratios for the well-off investor’s advised portfolios are equal to 0.163 
(indices) and 0.354 (stocks), whilst the optimal portfolio Sharpe ratios for the same investor 
category are equal to 0.521 (indices) and 0.689 (stocks), i.e. three and two times higher than 
the advised portfolio values, respectively. Table 7 confirms these results under assumption 
A1 for each category of investors. Using indices, the return for the well-off investor’s advised 
portfolios is about 0.274% and the risk is 0.664%. The optimal portfolio with the same risk 
(0.664%) has a return of 0.449%. The return of the optimal portfolio is therefore 0.17 lower 
than that associated with the advised portfolio.
We next consider the optimal portfolio structures to pinpoint the main reasons for the 
lack of performance in the advised portfolios, aiming to identify the sectors within the 
advised portfolios that were overweighted or underweighted with respect to the level of 
risk proposed by the analyst for each category of investors. Table 8 shows the composition 
of the Optimal Portfolio Indices under assumption A1 for each type of investor defined by 
Neymarck.
The first results show that the advised portfolios systematically involve a much higher 
number of indices than the corresponding optimal portfolios (Table 8, and ‘number’ lines in 
Table 7). For instance, Neymarck advises small investors to invest in eight different categories, 
Figure 2. Advised portfolios and the efficient frontier.
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yet the Modern Portfolio Theory states that their portfolios should be composed of five 
categories to reach a higher level of return. He also encourages well-off investors to distribute 
their holdings across eighteen categories and suggests that investors with large fortunes 
should spread them across 25 categories, yet the optimal portfolios of these two investor 
types are composed of nine categories of assets.
These results are driven by the fact that some indices are clearly dominated by others and 
add nothing to the diversification. For instance, the small investor’s portfolio is exclusively 
composed of safe-base investments. The categories it contains are very close and are all 
strongly correlated (see Supplementary material, Appendix 1 and Figure 1). This indicates 
that the indices included in the optimal portfolios are either those that are the least inter-cor-
related or those that slightly dominate other indices. The redeemable French rente is an 
attractive bond, since it is not only among the least risky and the least correlated categories, 
but is also located in the most profitable category. The ‘unguaranteed colonial debts’ index 
Table 8. optimal Portfolio according to the type of investor under assumption A1.
small MC Wo
Large 
Fortunes
index name Advised
optimal 
(risk) Advised
optimal 
(risk) Advised
optimal 
(risk) Advised
optimal 
(risk)
1 3% perpetual French rentes 0% 5% 0% 5% 0%
2 3% redeemable French rentes 30% 48% 25% 17% 20% 15% 10% 8%
3 Colonial loans guaranted by French 
government
0% 0% 0% 5% 0%
4 unguaranted Colonial debts 10% 1% 10% 0% 5% 0% 0%
5 Paris City bonds 20% 0% 10% 21% 10% 0% 3% 0%
6 Bonds issued by the Crédit Foncier 20% 30% 10% 16% 10% 0% 3% 0%
7 2,5% Bonds in main railways 
companies
20% 5% 15% 25% 10% 25% 5% 18%
8 3% Bonds in main railways 
companies
15% 2% 0% 5% 0%
9 Bonds issued by foreign railways 
companies
5% 0%
10 Bonds in industrial and 
miscellaneaous French companies
10% 0% 10% 4% 10% 9%
11 shares in a 6 main railways 
companies
10% 0% 15% 0% 6% 0%
12 shares in Algerian railways 
companies
3% 0%
13 shares in secondary railway 
network companies
2% 0%
14 shares in foreign railways 
companies
3% 0%
15 shares in French banks 9% 5% 15%
16 share in life insurance companies 5% 16% 3% 21%
17 share in fire insurance companies 4% 2% 3%
18 shares in foreign banks 5% 0%
19 shares in collery companies 6% 3% 10%
20 shares in metalworking, steelworks 
and building companies
5% 0% 3% 0%
21 shares in transportations, 
tramways and electricity 
companies
0% 3% 0%
22 shares in various indutrial 
companies
4% 2% 3%
23 Debts of low-risk countries 10% 14% 10% 19% 5% 13%
24 Debts of moderate-risk countries 3% 0%
25 Debts of high-risk countries 2% 0%
  total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
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is excluded from the optimal portfolio; this index is attractive in terms of return but is strongly 
correlated to the other indices and is also the least profitable category in terms of risk/return 
trade-off.
It is worth noting that this type of analysis is achieved via the precise evaluation of risk, 
return and correlations across indices. Although analysts at the beginning of the 20th century 
were familiar with these concepts, it was impossible for them to attain this level of detail 
(see also Rutterford & Sotiropoulos, 2016).
To go one step further, we adopted a more general approach by analyzing the aggregate 
composition of the Optimal Portfolios Indices under assumption A1 for each type of investor. 
These compositions are shown in Table 9. The safe base (Category A) is composed of the 
two 3% French rentes (indices 1 and 2), the two colonial debts indices (indices 3 and 4), 
Paris city bonds (index 5), Crédit Foncier bonds (index 6) and the 2.5% and 3% railway bond 
indices (indices 7 and 8). ‘Shares in French, Algerian and foreign railway companies’ include 
all the railway share indices, namely indices 11 to 14. ‘Shares in French and foreign banks 
and French insurance companies’ include all the bank and insurance shares indices, namely 
indices 15 to 18. ‘Shares in French and foreign industrial companies’ include all the industrial 
shares indices, namely indices 19 to 22. Finally, ‘debts of foreign countries’ include the three 
foreign debts indices, namely indices 23 to 25.
The compositions of the optimal portfolios (bearing the same risk) show that the optimal 
proportion dedicated to the safe base for middle-class investors is much higher than the 
proportion advised by Neymarck (86% and 70%, respectively). For this category, the optimal 
Table 9. Composition of the aggregated optimal portfolios.
small 
investors
Middle 
class Well-off
Large 
fortune
Advised
optimal 
(risk) Advised
optimal 
(risk) Advised
otimal 
(risk) Advised
optimal 
(risk)
A French rentes and Colonial 
debts
40% 49% 35% 22% 25% 15% 20% 8%
A Paris City bonds 20% 0% 10% 21% 10% 0% 3% 0%
A Bonds issued by the Crédit 
Foncier
20% 30% 10% 16% 10% 0% 3% 0%
A Bonds in main railways 
companies
20% 21% 15% 27% 10% 25% 10% 18%
total A (sAFe BAse) 100% 100% 70% 86% 55% 40% 35% 26%
B Bonds issued by foreign 
railways companies
0% 5% 0%
B Bonds in industrial and 
miscellaneaous French 
companies
10% 0% 10% 4% 10% 9%
total B 0% 10% 0% 10% 4% 15% 9%
C shares in French, Algerian and 
Foreign railways companies
10% 0% 15% 0% 14% 0%
C shares in French and Foreign 
banks and French insurance 
companies
5% 29% 15% 38%
C shares in French and Foreign 
indutrial companies
5% 10% 11% 14%
total C 0% 10% 0% 25% 38% 40% 53%
D Debts of foreign countries 10% 14% 10% 18% 10% 13%
total D 10% 14% 10% 18% 10% 13%
GLoBAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
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portfolio is exclusively composed by categories A and D (‘safe base’ and ‘debts of foreign 
countries’). Diversification on the stock market and other bonds does not seem necessary 
for this category of investors.
For the two richest categories of investors, the proportion invested in category A is 
lower than the proportion advised by Neymarck. The safe base is 41% for well-off investors 
and 26% for investors with large fortunes, whereas Neymarck advised investing much 
more, i.e. 55% for well-off investors and 35% for investors with large fortunes. Neymarck 
therefore seems to have overestimated the positive role played by the safe base on the 
risk/return trade-off for rich investors. Similar observations can be made for category B. 
The compositions of the optimal portfolios also show that Neymarck underweighted the 
optimal proportions dedicated to category C (category of shares), which represents 50% 
of the optimal portfolio for the richest investor and 38% of the optimal portfolio of the 
well-off categories. Table 9 shows that within category C, the ‘Shares in French, Algerian 
and Foreign railways companies’ are clearly overweighted by the analyst. It is worth noting 
that the French government guaranteed a minimum dividend value to the shareholders 
of main French railway companies and the Algerian railway companies, making them a 
potentially attractive investment. The proportion of wealth invested in ‘Shares in French 
and Foreign banks and French Insurance companies’ is strongly underestimated by 
Neymarck in this category.
Finally, Neymarck’s advice is a little over-cautious regarding investment in the ‘Debt of 
foreign countries’ index, particularly for well-off investors. Table 8 shows that this is due to 
the proportion of wealth invested in index 23 (‘Debt of low-risk country’). This index is attrac-
tive in terms of risk/return trade-off and the level of correlations (see Table 5 and 
Supplementary material, Appendix 1). The compositions of the optimal portfolios show that 
the optimal proportion invested in this index is expected to be 14% for middle-class investors 
(compared to 10% in advised portfolios), 19% for the well-off (vs. 10%) and 13% for investors 
with large fortunes (vs. 5%).
Overall, we can therefore consider that Neymarck overestimated the positive role played 
by the safe base for rich investors and that the diversification of the portfolio he implemented 
led him to overweight certain indices such as the railway shares guaranteed by the French 
government, while underweighting the role played by shares in ‘French and foreign banks 
and French insurance companies’ and foreign bond markets.
5. Conclusion
To the best of our knowledge, this article describes the first test of portfolio advice given by 
a French financial analyst in the early 20th century to evaluate how sound, effective and 
efficient this advice was. Our analysis focused on Neymarck’s book (1913) Que doit-on faire 
de son argent?, in which he suggests a portfolio composed of categories of securities listed 
on the Paris Stock Exchange for each of four categories of investor wealth.
In a first step, we created a custom-made database using data for all the types of secu-
rities listed on the Paris Stock Exchange before 1913 and reported in L’Économiste Français. 
The database is split into 25 categories based on Neymarck’s categories of securities, and 
contains the monthly returns of 139 securities listed continuously on the Paris Stock 
Exchange from January 1903 to December 1912. We consider this database to be a reliable 
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indicator of public financial information. We then compared Neymarck’s advised portfolios 
with the performances of these Paris Stock Exchange indices. Our findings reveal that 
Neymarck correctly identified the least risky categories of assets, namely the safe base, and 
successfully evaluated the overall risk of each sector.
We then considered risk-averse investors following the Modern Portfolio Theory and built 
optimal portfolios following two main assumptions (presence or absence of a risk-free asset). 
For each type of investor, we considered the investment universe to be limited to the cate-
gories suggested by Neymarck.
This study shows a hierarchy in Neymarck’s advised portfolios. The investors with less 
resources create portfolios with lower risk and return, whilst richer investors have portfolios 
with higher risk and return but also a higher Sharpe ratio. The results reveal that these port-
folios exploit the benefits of diversification. This paper also demonstrates a systematic under-
weighting of the safe base by Neymarck for richer investors. The portfolio implemented by 
Neymarck led him to overweight some indices (i.e., railway shares guaranteed by the French 
government) while underweighting the role played by the shares of some companies 
(namely shares in French and foreign banks and French insurance companies).
However, the aforementioned imperfections enabled us to make some assumptions about 
how Neymarck composed his portfolios and particularly about how he estimated the risk 
and return of securities. Indeed, it seems that although he had correctly identified the least 
risky securities, his estimates were conceptual rather than based on rigorous calculus. This 
may have led Neymarck to suggest investing in too many categories of securities, whereas 
the optimization process requires much fewer. It is also important to note that Neymarck 
did not have access to any technology permitting the easy calculation and compilation of 
statistics to obtain optimal portfolios. His advice reflects the state of financial knowledge of 
the time, which Edlinger and Parent (2014) describe as a common-sense approach to port-
folio theory at the beginning of the 20th century.
Ultimately, our results should be seen as a complement to the recent series of works on the 
composition of pre-WW1 UK portfolios. Our results illustrate what Rutterford and Sotiropoulos 
(2016) call the ‘UK-French connection’ favouring diversification. Indeed, the quality assessment 
of the advice provided by Neymarck is consistent, to a certain extent, with the MPT findings. 
Our results provide reliable evidence based on Neymarck’s financial advice documents that 
rigorous portfolio selection techniques were proposed to French investors.
Notes
 1. Bignon and Miscio, (2010, p. 397) recall that Neymarck advised investors to check the identity 
and interests of the management and journalists of a journal before trusting it.
 2. For an analysis of investor financial portfolio strategies in England during the second half of the 
nineteenth century, see Sotiropoulos and Rutterford (2018) and Rutterford, Sotiropoulos, 
& van Lieshout (2017).
 3. According to Neymarck, (1913, p. 348), ‘For risk division to be effective there must be several 
placements of different types: national or local government loans, railway stock, various indus-
trial companies and so on […]  but this is not enough […] the diversification and decrease of 
risk should be carried out by distributing investments across stock from various countries’.
 4. For instance, he describes the ‘stock for additional income’ as ‘exposed to more vagaries than 
[…] sound investments’, and considers that they could boost the average income of a portfolio 
because they are ‘likely to see capital gains’ (1906, pp. 75, 81–82).
 5. A more detailed description of this advice can be found in the second part of the paper.
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 6. Arbulu, 1998; Parent & Rault, 2004; Gallais-Hamono, 2007; Vaslin 2007; Rezaee, 2010; Lebris & 
Hautcoeur, 2010.
 7. Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, who became a Professor at the Collège de France, published many books 
dealing with economics that revealed the concerns of French society prior to World War One. 
He also founded his own journal, L’Économiste Français, in 1873. He managed it until his death, 
supplying the readers of the journal with articles and information about economics, business 
and finance. Paul Leroy-Beaulieu presented and developed his advice in a successful handbook 
entitled L’Art de Placer et Gérer sa Fortune (1906).
 8. We decided against using the Cours Authentique, published every day by the Compagnie des 
Agents de Change, because we assumed that this daily publication was designed for profes-
sionals operating on the Paris Stock Exchange rather than for ordinary investors. In addition, 
not all securities were listed on a daily basis. For example, a third of the available securities 
were not exchanged on July 1st 1912, and were therefore not quoted in the edition of Cours 
Authentique published that day.
 9. Note that although Neymarck suggests investing 10% of funds in industrial French and foreign 
bonds, he does not add foreign industrial bonds to the portfolio of investors with large fortune, 
despite it is the largest portfolio. Edlinger and Parent (2014) therefore consider that he advises 
well-off investors to invest 10% in industrial French bonds alone.
 10. «At the outset, can we ever be certain that we will choose the best assets? It is difficult to la-
bel  assets as goods and rank them with numbers so that people can say, «buy N° 1 assets 
rather than N° 2 assets. A given asset may be the best one at one moment in time, but not at 
another. For example, a state fund may be the best asset to acquire when an event makes the 
price fall to a moderate level, yet it had not been the best value asset on the previous day. We 
can therefore say that an asset is good, very good, or excellent, but we cannot affirm that it is 
absolutely the best » (Neymarck, 1913, p. 368).
 11. As a major part of our analysis is run using indices, this choice has no impact on our main 
 conclusions.
 12. See Table 4.
 13. Note that asset category 13 is the only index made by just one security. This asset category 
weights 2% of one portfolio advised by Neymarck and is never included in the optimal 
 portfolio. The results are not modified by the presence or absence of this category.
 14. The bank shares index (18) is particularly interesting for the portfolio, since it shows very little 
additional risk for much higher return.
 15. Note that the out-of-sample performance of this strategy is clearly debated. DeMiguel, 
Garlappi, and Uppal (2009) conclude that the out-of-sample performance of the sample-based 
mean-variance model (and its extensions designed to reduce estimation errors) is not consis-
tently better than the 1/N rule ratio (called naïve diversification) in terms of Sharpe ratio. For a 
comparison between buy-and-hold and naïve strategies before WW1, see also Sotiropoulos 
and Rutterford (2018). This is tested in the next section.
 16. ‘Toutes les valeurs, sans aucune exception, présentent des risques ; l’expression valeurs de tout 
repos, valeurs de toute sécurité n’est qu’une expression; en réalité, les placements mobiliers de 
même que les placements immobiliers, présentent des aléas…’.
 17. Over the period considered (1903–1912), we identified four securities that were less risky than 
the 3% French Rentes: one Paris city bond and three bonds issued by the Crédit Foncier.
 18. ‘Ce livre ne s’adresse pas aux professionnels de la Bourse’ (Neymarck, 1913, p. V).
 19. Our main conclusions are not modified by this choice.
 20. This choice of distribution has very little effect on our results.
 21. Note that by extending our data from January 1913 to July 1914, the results dealing with the  ex-post 
performance of Neymarck’s advice against the performance of the mean variance optimization 
over two periods (one year and eighteen months) are mixed. The results show that the advice of 
Neymarck outperform the optimization for two of the four investor categories (small investors and 
middle-class investors) and that the ex-post returns are very close for a third category (well-off inves-
tors). For instance, over a horizon of 18 months, the Sharpe ratio associated to the portfolio advised 
by Neymarck for the 4 categories of investors was 0.89, 1,08, 1,58 and 1.22,  respectively.  For the 
mean-variance portfolio, these values were 0.75, 1.02, 1,61 and 1.92,  respectively.
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